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Introduction

Abraham Lincoln said, "It is as much the duty of government to render prompt
justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals."' President Lincoln spoke with regard to a nascent nation
whose continued existence and eventual success were - at least in part - dependent on the perceived legitimacy of its governing bodies.
Lincoln's words hold true today, with regard to government as well as international organizations. Although the United States of America and the United Nations are fundamentally distinct in character, size, influence and other features,
their legitimacy remains integral to both.
This comment examines the immunity of United Nations peacekeepers
through a comparison of the legal recourse available to those affected by two
recent significant water crises: the cholera outbreak in Haiti and the contamination of public drinking water in Flint, Michigan. The legal recourse available to
victims of conduct of government and international organizations is fraught with
historical ramifications and hurdles for individuals. For example, in the United
States, there is a long history of sovereign immunity to protect the function of
government. Similarly, member nations have long afforded the United Nations
vast legal protections.
This comment explores the apparent justifications for such immunities, and
assesses the real, limited value in continuing those policies. Immunity is theoretically necessary for the routine function of the United Nations and American government; however, in practice, blanket immunities propagate the unequal,
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unethical and inhumane application of law. The following comparison and analysis revolve around the concepts of the absolute and functional immunity of the
United Nations in Haiti and sovereign immunity with regard to government actors and entities in Flint, Michigan.
The United Nations is predicated upon helping states, regions and people in
need, and "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." 2 Among the mechanisms available to the United Nations in affecting such ideals, peacekeeping operations are an essential instrument
in pursuing the goals of the organization on missions around the world. Such
operations, and the peacekeepers involved, are considered to be "subsidiary organs of the General Assembly or the Security Council." 345 Moreover, United
Nations peacekeepers are referred to either by explicit designation or by
function.6
While the fundamental goals of the United Nations peacekeeping missions are
benevolent and altruistic, there have been multiple allegations of human rights
violations by United Nations peacekeepers. Although the possibility of human
rights violations by an organization centered on the pursuit of human rights
seems self-defeating and wrong, it also raises questions concerning the accountability of the United Nations. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the
highest judicial body within the United Nations. 7 The ICJ only hears disputes
between members states, and may issue advisory opinions regarding issues that
internal UN organs and agencies raise.8 Even with regard to member states, ICJ
jurisdiction relies upon the agreement by each party to "abide by the [ICJ's]
jurisdiction." Id. Accountability of the UN itself, however, is a different matter.
Courts around the world have resisted finding the United Nations or its agents
responsible. 9
2 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
3 Brian D. Tittemore, Belligerents in Blue Helmets: Applying InternationalHumanitarian Law to
United Nations Peace Operations, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61, 77 (1997).
4 See generally UNITED NATIONS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/en/ga

(last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (The United Nations General Assembly is "one of the six main organs of the
United Nations, the only one in which all Member States (193) have equal representation." The United
Nations General Assembly addresses a variety of issues, including "development, peace and security,
[and] international law").

5

See generally UNITIED NATIONS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL, www.un.org/en/sc (last visited Nov. 3,

2017) (The Security Council is a 15-member body whose task is to determine "the existence of a threat to
the peace or an act of aggression" in carrying out its duty of maintaining "international peace and
security").
6 See Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113 (2010).
7 GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, https://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/the-intemationalcourt-of-justice.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).

8

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: HoW THE COURT WORKS, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/how-the-

court-works (last visited Nov. 3, 2017).
9 See, e.g., HR [Supreme Court of the Neth.] 13-04-2012, NJ 2014, 262 m.nt. (Mothers of Srebrenica Assoc./Netherlands); see also Nicole Winfield, UN FailedRwanda, Associated Press (Dec. 16, 1999),
reprinted in GLOBAL POL'Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-rwandal
39240.html.
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Sovereign immunity is also well-entrenched with regard to the liability of the
United States, and, since the mid-nineteenth century, well-settled law indicates
that "the United States may not be sued without its consent." 10 While "there is no
consensus that absolute jurisdictional immunity is necessary,"" sovereign immunity is not a constitutional violation within the United States.1 2 Various legal
immunities have long been a part of the American system of government and
"are firmly embedded in American law."' 3 However, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."14
II.

Background

A.

United Nations: A History of Immunity

-

The United Nations' functional and absolute immunity are fundamental to understanding the consequences of the United Nations' actions around the world.
During its existence, the United Nations has adopted several agreements impacting its own immunity. Such documents include the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations ("CPIUN"), International
Organizations Immunities Act and the United Nations' Model Status of Force
Agreement.
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the CPIUN in 1946, shortly
after the establishment of the United Nations.' 5 As a result, the United Nations
a new, groundbreaking international alliance at the time - received broad immunity.' 6 According to the Convention, the United Nations "shall enjoy immunity
from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has
expressly waived its immunity." 1 7 Almost from inception, the United Nations
possessed "de facto 'absolute' immunity." 8 19 However, this immunity was
somewhat mitigated by a provision appearing later in the document. 20 The provi10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, et al., Jurisdiction Over Actions Against the United
States-The Sovereign Immunity Problem, 14 FED. PRAc. & PRoc. JuRIs. § 3654 (4th ed.) (last updated
April 2017).
11 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167, 1183
(1982).
12 Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 114 (2010).
'3

Id.

14 Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).

15 August Reinisch, Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations: Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, the Specialized Agencies, http://legal.un
.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisae.pdf, 2 (2009).
16 Id.
7 Id. at 1-2 (acknowledging that the CPIUN occurredat a time when "the privileges and immunities
of internationalorganizations was largely unchartedterritory").

18
19
while
judge
20

Id.

Absolute immunity is "a complete exemption from civil liability, usually afforded to officials
performing particularly important functions, such as a representative enacting legislation and a
presiding over a lawsuit." Absolute Immunity, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Reinisch, supra note 15, at 2.
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sion required the United Nations to "make provisions for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private
law character to which the United Nations is a party. . .".21
The United Nations' alleged effort to provide an avenue to settlement notably
appears in a document that sets forth potential legal consequences when the
United Nations enters a nation in its peacekeeping capacity. 22 That document is
called a Status of Force Agreement, or "SOFA." 2 3 It is a permutation of the
United Nations' Model Status of Force Agreement that: "provides for the establishment of a standing claims commission in order to settle disputes of a private
law character over which the local courts have no jurisdiction due to the immunity of the United Nations. 2 4

-

Furthermore, the United Nations has acknowledged its dual role of allowing
private citizens' claims in civil cases while recognizing the United Nations' immunity. 25 In practice, however, no such claims commission has been created in
the history of the United Nations. 26 The burden of this reality falls squarely on
vulnerable individuals in unstable regions of the world. Those regions are the
most likely to warrant United Nations presence in the first place. The likelihood
of achieving legal recourse in the nation's legal system is even lower, so when
there is no recourse against the United Nations, there is no recourse at all.
Within the United States, Congress has passed legislation that is significant
with regard to the immunity of international organizations. Such legislation includes the IOIA of 1945 and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") of
1976.27 The main purpose of the IOIA was to grant international organizations
like the United Nations - "privileges and immunities of a governmental nature." 2 8 The FSIA enabled the judicial branch to make determinations of immunity for international organizations, rather than the executive branch. 2 9 According
to the FSIA, foreign nations and international organizations were subject to limited liability - depending on the applicability of certain carve-outs - where they

21 Id.
22 Jan Wouters & Pierre Schmitt, Challenging Acts of Other United Nations' Organs, Subsidiary
Organs and Officials 31 (Leuven Center for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 49, 2010),
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working papers/new-series/wp4l-50/wp49.pdf.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 30 (asserting that "in civil cases, the uniform practice is to maintain immunity, while offering
in accord with Section 29 of the General Convention, alternative means of dispute settlement").
26 Id.
27 See Kevin M. Whiteley, Holding InternationalOrganizationsAccountable Under the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act: Civil Actions Against the United Nations for Non-Commercial Torts, 7 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 619 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 79-1203, at 946 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 946) (2008).
28 Id. at 626.
29 Id. at 625.
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previously had not been so vulnerable. 30 However, the FSIA did not narrow the
31
immunity that the United Nations maintains under the IOIA.
Additionally, in the United States, necessity further justifies the immunity of
international organizations. 32 This theory is called the "'functional necessity' test
of international immunities." 33 Accordingly, immunity for international organizations is essential for a body to strive toward its mission. Thus, the United Nations retains its "independence from national control." 34
B.

Expansion of United Nations' Immunity

In addition to organizational protection from legal recourse, there is further
insulation from liability for actors and agents of the United Nations.35 This iteration of defense appears in the form of "functional immunity," meaning that "all
members of a peacekeeping operation are immune from legal process for acts
36
performed by them in their official capacities."
Consequently, the United Nations and those who act on its behalf exist behind
a shield of multiple layers of legal immunity. In reality, the immunity exists
unless and until it is waived. 37 As illustrated by various inquiries into the ethics
of United Nations actions, it appears unlikely that the organization would voluntarily expose itself to liability by taking responsibility for its conduct.
Alarmingly, courts have expanded the protection afforded to the United Nations to other actors as well, including to military forces serving as part of a
United Nations campaign. In Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v. State of the Netherlands and the United Nations, the Dutch Supreme Court held that the Netherlands was not liable for a genocide occurring while an ethnic and religious
minority was under the protection of the United Nations security forces and the
Netherlands military personnel. 3839 The court reasoned that the Netherlands escaped liability because it acted as part of the United Nations Protection Force
30 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 678 (2004); Whiteley, supra note 27, at 658 (Kevin
M. Whiteley concluded, "Long gone are the days when international organizations were minor participants in global politics in need of protection from member states. Today these organizations, especially
the United Nations, have accumulated immense wealth and wield vast amounts of power. Under such
conditions, the lack of absolute immunity appears neither to threaten the existence of the organization nor
its functionality").
31 Brzak, supra note 12, at 112.
32 JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note 11, at I1I I.
33 Id.
34 Id.

35 Code Blue, Fact Sheet: Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (2015), http://www.code
bluecampaign.com/fact-sheets-materials/2015/5/13/immunity.
36 Id.

-

37 Reinisch, supra note 15, at 2.
38 Wouters & Schmitt, supra note 22, at 8.
39 In 1995, a Dutch military unit under the control of the United Nations oversaw an ethnic group
the Srebrenica enclave - in eastern Bosnia. HR 13 April 2012, NJ 2014, 262 m.nt., Mothers of Srebrenica, at 3. The unit failed to protect the group, and 8,000 people from the enclave were subsequently killed
in a genocide. Id. In response, families of those killed in Srebrenica alleged that the victims were killed as
a result of the inaction of United Nations peacekeepers. Id. In the lawsuit that followed in the Nether-
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("UNPROFOR"), which - as an arm of the United Nations - had default absolute
immunity. 40 Similarly, in N.K. v. Austria, an Austrian court dismissed the plaintiff's claim alleging property damage.4 1 The court held that the defendant, an
Austrian soldier, was "acting as an organ of the United Nations and not of Austria." 42 Therefore, Austria was protected under the growing umbrella of the
United Nations immunity.
C.

The Role of the United Nations in Haiti's Cholera Outbreak

Located just six hundred and eighty nine (689) miles from Miami, Florida,
Haiti has a per capita gross domestic product that is over seventy-five (75) times
smaller than that of the United States. 4 3 It has a population of nearly eleven (11)
million people. 4 4 According to the World Health Organization ("WHO"), the life
expectancy in Haiti is almost sixteen (16) years shorter than in the United
States. 4 5 The United Nations' current mission in Haiti is its seventh in the small
island nation, which is the most for any nation on earth. 46
Peacekeeping missions have been a staple of the United Nations, and there
have been seventy-one (71) since the organization was created in 1945.47 United
Nations peacekeeping missions are necessarily aimed at helping regions and
populations that are vulnerable, due to poverty, war or natural disaster and in
need of support that local government and infrastructure cannot provide.
The current United Nations' mission in Haiti ("MINUSTAH") began in
2004.48 The mission was active on January 12, 2010, when an earthquake devastated Haiti. 49 In response to the earthquake, the United Nations increased resources to the MINUSTAH mission, including additional peacekeepers.5 0 As a
part of this augmented effort, a group of peacekeepers traveled to Haiti from
lands, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that the United Nations retained its immunity, regardless of the gravity of the claims. Id. at 12.
40 Id.

41 Id. at 20.
42 Id. at 21.
43 Statistics Times, List of Countries by Projected GDP per Capita (June 7, 2017), http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp-capita.php.
44 The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html.
45 World Health Org., Life Expectancy at Birth (years), 2000-2015, http://gamapserver.who.int/gho/
interactivecharts/mbd/ife expectancyatlas.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
46 Thomas G. Bode, Cholera in Haiti: United Nations Immunity and Accountability, 47 GEO. J.
INT'L. L. 759, 761-62 (2016).
47 UNITED NATIONS, United Nations Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/
statistics/factsheet.shtml (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).

48 The mission is called the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or "MINUSTAH."
MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/missions/minustah/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
49 Bode, supra note 46, at 762 (On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake caused devastating
damage to Haiti. As a result, 217,000 people perished, and another 300,000 were injured. Two hundred
fifty thousand residences and thirty thousand businesses were also destroyed).
50 Bode, supra note 46, at 765.
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Nepal. 5 ' Coincidentally, there had been a cholera epidemic at that time in Nepal. 5 2 One of the unintended consequences of their presence was the contamination of local water with cholera, which was subsequently transmitted to the local
people.
Despite being a developing nation with limited socioeconomic status, Haiti
had no history of cholera prior to 2010.53 Until then, Haiti had managed to avoid
a cholera outbreak due partially to the government's awareness of its vulnerability and partially because of Haiti's lagging economy through which Haiti had less
international trade than other Caribbean nations. 54 Despite three cholera
epidemics in the Caribbean in the 19th century, research by the Center for Disease Control found no evidence of cholera in Haiti during that time.55
However, in 2010, the arrival of cholera with United Nations peacekeepers
was catastrophic. The United Nations has estimated that the arrival of cholera led
to approximately four thousand, five hundred (4,500) deaths and illness in three
hundred thousand (300,000) people in Haiti, and it "continues to cause infections
and death" there. 56 While economic torpor had once insulated Haiti, when cholera finally did arrive, the outbreak was worse because of "simultaneous water
and sanitation and health care system deficiencies." 5 7
Determining the culpability for the cholera epidemic in Haiti languished in
comparison to the rapid pace at which cholera devastated hundreds of thousands
of Haitians.5 8 An "independent panel of experts" 59 sought to determine the
source of the outbreak. The panel concluded that the cholera was caused by
human activity and the cholera in Haiti was the same strain of cholera that was
found in the South Asian strain. 6 0 While the panel developed the possible connection between the United Nations Peacekeepers who arrived from Nepal - in
South Asia - and cholera in Haiti, the experts' ultimately found that "the Haiti
51 Id. at 764-65.
52

Id.

Deborah Jenson et al., Cholera in Haiti and Other Caribbean Regions, 19th Century, 17 (11)
2130, 2130 (2011).
54 Id. at 2133-34.
55 Id. at 2133.
56 Dr. Alejandro Cravioto et al., Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera
Outbreak in Haiti, 3, UNrrIED NATIONs, http://www.un.org/News/dhlinfocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2017).
57 Id. at 4.
58 According to a 2011 United Nations press release, the Secretary-General communicated the need
to determine the source of the Haiti cholera outbreak as early as December 17, 2010. United Nations,
Press Release: Deeply Concerned from Outset by Cholera Outbreak in Haiti, Secretary-GeneralAppoints Independent Expert Panel, http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sgsmI7705.doc.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2016). According to the release, "determining the source of the cholera outbreak is important for both
the United Nations and the people of Haiti." Id. The release further explains that the United Nations will
cooperate completely in the investigation of an independent group, appearing to recognize the importance
of transparency and credibility in the investigation. Id. Although it is honorable to support such a factfinding expedition to stem the scourge of cholera, it also appears that the United Nations sought to
maintain - or achieve - reputation of benevolence and credibility with regards to its investigation. Id.
53

EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES

59
60

See Cravioto, supra note 56.
Cravioto, supra note 56, at 29.
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cholera outbreak was caused by the confluence of circumstances. . . and was not
the fault or, or the deliberate action of, a group or individual." 6 1
D. The Role of Local Government in the Contamination of Flint's Drinking
Water
The potential for contamination of drinking water in Flint, Michigan has long
existed as the leaching of the municipality's lead water pipes demonstrate. 62 Furthermore, city officials operated the Flint Water Treatment Plant on a mere quarterly basis from 1967 to 2014, likely with little inspection as it served as a backup
water treatment plant during that time. 6 3 However, steps immediately precipitating such contamination began in 2014 in response to the nation's economic crisis
which had particularly acute effects in Flint. 64 At that time, Michigan Governor
Rick Snyder placed an Emergency Manager in charge of the operations of the
city of Flint.6 5 As part of cost-cutting measures, the Emergency Manager - a
non-elected individual - and other state officials switched the source of Flint's
drinking water from Lake Huron to the Flint River. 66 The results have been catastrophic for local residents.
A group of Virginia Tech researchers conducted a study of lead levels in
Flint's water in the summer of 2015.67 The study contained analysis from two
hundred and seventy one (271) homes in Flint.68 The study revealed that the 90th
percentile for lead concentration in the city - an important metric for city officials - was over five times higher than the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") recommended limit. 6 9 Additionally, investigators
discovered that some homes had lead levels in the water that qualified as "toxic
waste" according to the EPA, as well as lead levels in the water of one residence
that was almost eight hundred (800) times the recommended limit. 70
Investigations into the Flint water contamination revealed that in 2011, independent consultants for the city determined that keeping or making the Flint
water system safe would require fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) in improve61 Id.
62 FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK

FORCE, FINAL REPORT 16 (2016).

63 Id. at 15.
6 Complaint at 2, Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 2016 WL 319206 (E.D. Mich.)
(No. 16-10277).

65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Christopher Ingraham, This Is How Toxic Flint's Water Really Is, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/15/this-is-how-toxic-flints-water-really-is/?
utm_term=.2a441192d84c.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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ments.7 ' However, it appears that city and state officials did not pursue such
regulatory measures. 7 2
In a report analyzing the causation of the contamination of drinking water in
Flint, an independent task force reported that "primary responsibility for the crisis in Flint, Mich. lies with a state environmental agency called the Michigan
Department of Environmental Quality." 7 3 The task force also found that the
Michigan Department of Health and Human Services had data indicating that the
water was contaminated, and failed to adequately act to protect Flint's residents. 74 The Michigan Safe Drinking Water Act (M.C.L.A. § 325.1005 et seq.)
and the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 300 et seq.) provide the
statutory guidelines to which governmental bodies - at least in theory - are required to adhere. Despite numerous layers of statutory protection regarding the
quality of drinking water, safe drinking water is not guaranteed.
The reality of an American city depriving its citizens of potable drinking water
has, justifiably, been shocking to many people.75 While disputes continue with
regard to other natural and man-made resources - like oil rights, for example - it
seems unconscionable for water, as a basic necessity, to be expendable. According to the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, local governments are required to
provide safe drinking water "by testing the water for harmful contaminants and
treating the water to control for those pollutants." 76
III.

Discussion

Sovereign immunity has long been an important governmental protection
against liability.7 7 Among the justifications for sovereign immunity are tradition,
the protection of government treasuries and the "existence of adequate alternative
remedies." 7 While sovereign immunity has been firmly entrenched in governments around the world - and in the United States, in particular - it seems contradictory based on the American tenet that "government and government
officials can do wrong and must be held accountable." 7 9 Sovereign immunity has
even been criticized as an "anachronistic relic"8 0 whose continued existence rests
71 Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 595, 602 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
72 Id.

73 Merrit Kennedy, Independent Investigators:State Officials Mostly To Blame For Flint Water Crisis, NPR (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/23/471585633/independentinvestigators-state-officials-mostly-to-blame-for-flint-water-crisis.
74 Id.

75 Jean Ross, The Crisis in Flint is About More than Poisoned Water, FORD FOUNDArION (Feb. 2,
2016), https://www.fordfoundation.org/ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/the-crisis-in-flint-is-about-morethan-poisoned-water/.
76 Rita Ann Cicero, In Flint, Lawsuits Over Drinking Water ContaminationStart Trickling In, 33 No.
26 WL J. Toxic TORTs 4, Feb. 12, 2016, at 1, 2.

77 See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1216.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1202.
80 Id. at 1201.
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on the premise that "protecting the government treasury is more important than
the benefits of liability in terms of ensuring compensation and deterrence." 8 1
Various constitutional scholars have been unable to find a basis for sovereign
immunity in the Constitution of the United States, and have even found it to be
"inconsistent with three fundamental constitutional principles: the supremacy of
the Constitution and federal laws; the accountability of government; and due process of law." 82 Such shortcomings suggest that governmental entities ought not to
be so shielded by a theory that contradicts the very foundation of democracy.
Sovereign immunity is the legal turning point for the calamities in Haiti and
Flint, Michigan. This powerful immunity distinguishes the defendants - government entities in Flint and the United Nations in Haiti - from private actors. Private actors whose actions lead to the same results would likely face enormous
legal consequences. But sovereign immunity seems to serve as an insurmountable hurdle in the instant cases.
With regard to United Nations' accountability, legal scholars have asserted
that the court's decision in Georges v. United Nations was correct in terms of its
interpretation of the law and consistency with prior holdings.83 In Georges, the
court held that the United Nations' failure to enact remedial measures by which
injured parties could seek recourse against the United Nations - as mandated by
the CPIUN - did not waive the United Nations' immunity. 84 Furthermore, the
Second Circuit recognized its holding in Georges to be consistent with its previous decisions, maintaining that "purported inadequacies of the United Nations'
dispute resolution mechanism did not result in a waiver of absolute immunity
from suit." 8 5
Such an argument is difficult to dispute given the vast protections that courts
around the world have afforded governments and their agents in the past. However, the more worthwhile and necessary discussion revolves around the very
policies upon which centuries of sovereign immunity is based. Although the application of a law may be correct in terms of how that law is written or intended,
such application does nothing further to justify the law, just as a term cannot be
used in its own definition. Therefore, the decision to maintain United Nations and
United Nations peacekeeper immunity may be considered "good policy" only
insofar as it extends decades of unethical and unjust jurisprudence.8 6 Courts and
policymakers prioritize the fiscal health of the United Nations over the ethical
duties to the individuals that the United Nations was created to serve.
Flint's victims of contaminated water face similarly narrow avenues for recourse, with an important exception being the liability of the municipality of
Flint. The Flint Water Advisory Task Force reached damning conclusions about
the causes of and responsibility for the lead contamination in the report it
81 Id.
82 Id.

83
84
85
86

110

at 1217.
at 1210.

Bode, supra note 46, at 780.
Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 97 (2nd Cir. 2016).
Id. at n.48.
Bode, supra note 46, at 781.
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presented an important report to the Governor of Michigan.8 7 The Task Force
ultimately asserted that "the Flint water crisis is a clear case of environmental
injustice."88 As the United Nations has - in theory - the duty of creating a system of legal and financial recourse for victims, the Task Force also recommended
specific steps that various governmental entities should take to fix the problems it
created and ameliorate the burden on the citizens of Flint.8 9
In both scenarios, though thousands of miles apart, there seems to be a striking
similarity. Rather than holding governments, international organizations and their
agents to account for the errors in their conduct, the legal systems merely encourage the such bodies to "do the right thing." State and federal statutes, as well
as international treaties and agreements, exist in theory to protect public health
and public safety. If the result of such a system were actual government action
and relief to those victimized by governmental action or negligence, such a
framework would be sufficient. In reality, however, relief is slow and insufficient, if existent at all.
IV.

Analysis

Legal action has been limited with respect to both the crises in Haiti and Flint.
In Georges v. United Nations, a class of plaintiffs and their decedents filed a
class action suit against United Nations for the illnesses and death caused by
cholera in Haiti. 90 The United States Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) ruled in
2016 for the United Nations. 9 1 Following the United Nations' argument for absolute immunity based on Section 29 of the CPIUN, the court dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on immunity. 9 2 Before the case was
decided, the United States executive branch submitted a statement of interest to
'immune from legal process
the court, and "took the position that defendants are9 394
Charter."
Nations
United
the
to
pursuant
suit'
and
The United Nations offered a late, meaningless apology in December of
2016.95 While expressing "moral responsibility" and "deep regret", Secretary87
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88 Id. at 54.
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90 Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 98 (2nd Cir. 2016).
91 Id.
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94 Alejandra Salmeron Alfaro, JASTA: Impact on the Principleof Sovereign Immunity, 37 MICH. J.
INT'L. L. (2016) (amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), Justice Against Sponsors of

Terrorism Act (JASTA) amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) opening the door to
private parties seeking legal action against foreign governments. Justification for this legislation was
formally based on the efforts of American families of victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, it appears to introduce the analogue of foreign individuals having standing to bring suit against the
United States - or potentially other international organizations in courts in the United States - in the
future).
95 Somini Sengupta, U.N. Apologizes for Role in Haiti's2010 Cholera Outbreak, NY TIMES (Dec. 1,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/world/americas/united-nations-apology-haiti-cholera.html.
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General Ban Ki-moon did not assume legal responsibility on behalf of the United
Nations. 96 According to The New York Times, "the group that represents the victims, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, has said it has not yet
decided on whether to take the matter to the United States Supreme Court to seek
compensation." 9 7 However, based on the response of American courts in the past,
and their apparent aversion to assigning liability to the United Nations, it is unlikely to amount to legal accountability even if a case is filed with the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Although less open-and-shut than legal proceedings for Haiti's victims of
U.N.-caused water contamination, legal recourse in Flint, Michigan also appears
limited,. 98 The most prominent lawsuit filed with regard to the water crisis in
Flint was Concerned Pastorsfor Social Action v. Khouri (2016 WL 319206
(E.D. Mich.)), a civil action filed in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan. In Concerned Pastorsfor Social Action v. Khouri, three
organizations and an individual brought a lawsuit on behalf of the residents of
Flint, Michigan with regard to the water contamination. 9 9 The court ruled that
although the 11th Amendment gives general immunity to officials from suit in
federal court - "a plaintiff can avoid this sovereign immunity bar by suing for
injunctive or declaratory relief, rather than monetary relief." 0 0 Moreover, the
court ruled that "the state defendants have exerted a level of control to bring them
10
within the scope of the Safe Drinking Water Act's requirements."o
In March of 2017, a federal judge in Michigan approved a settlement in the
Khouri case in which "the state of Michigan has agreed to spend up to $97 million for new water lines in the city of Flint."1 02 According to the settlement,
Michigan will provide funding for related health programs until March 2021.103
To date, this is the largest remedial expenditure related to the water crisis in

Flint. 104
While financial recovery appears to remain limited for potential plaintiffs in
Flint, developments in other federal jurisdictions may prove fruitful in future
litigation. For example, in a North Carolina water contamination case, a federal
district court judge denied the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs
Federal Tort Claims Act case, despite the government's predication of its motion
on sovereign immunity.10 5 In Jones, the government argued that it retained sover96 Id.
97 Id.

98 See Jenson, supra note 53; Concerned Pastors, supra note 71 at 595, 602.
99 Supra note 71, at 593.
100 Id. at 604.
101 Id. at 606.

102 Merrit Kennedy, Judge Approves $97 Million Settlement To Replace Flint's Water Lines, NPR
(Mar. 28, 2017, 2:10PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/28/521786192/judge-approves-97-million-settlement-to-replace-flints-water-lines.
103 Id.

104 See Guertin v. Michigan, 2017 WL 2418007 (E.D. Mich. 2017); Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (6th
Cir. 2017); Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. City of Flint, 2017 WL 4641897 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
105 Jones v. U.S., 691 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643 (E.D. N.C. 2010).
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eign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act because the water contamination related merely to its discretionary functions. 106 Nevertheless, the court held
that the government already had notice of the contamination when the plaintiff
lived on the government's property, and that the plaintiffs complaint was timely
filed within a standard of reasonable diligence in becoming aware of the injury. 10 7 Therefore, the court permitted the plaintiff's to proceed under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.' 08
The availability of legal remedies available in response to the government's
contamination of drinking water in the United States depends on two variables;
(i) the type of relief the plaintiffs seek and (ii) the level of government opposing
the claim.1 0 9 In Concerned Pastors v. Khouri, the Flint plaintiffs did not seek
compensatory damages.' 10 Rather, the plaintiffs are sought "equitable relief
to mitigate the health and medical risks resulting from the defendants'
violations."'''
While it is very difficult to attain monetary relief from state and federal government in the United States, municipal governments are not protected by sovereign immunity. 12 Therefore, municipal governments remain susceptible to legal
recourse even when the state government is not.'' 3 Gil Seinfeld, a law professor
at the University of Michigan, has maintained that there is established legal theory for Flint plaintiffs to seek - and win - damages from the city of Flint.' 14
Furthermore, a municipality is subject to ever broader liability when it expands the scope of its activities: "A municipality acting in a private or proprietary
capacity, in contrast to a governmental capacity, could be subject to tort liability
under the same rules that apply to private persons or corporations.11 5 In S.A.B.
Enterprises, Inc. v. Village of Athens, a New York appellate court found that
"supplying water through lines to local customers" was proprietary and thus subjected it to potential tort liability.'"6 Even more broadly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a municipal water authority is liable when a dangerous
water condition "created a foreseeable risk. . . and that the local agency had
actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice. . . of the dangerous
106 Marine's Spouse Can Sue U.S. Over Tainted Drinking Water, 28 No. 3 WL J. Toxic TORrs 2, 1
(Mar. 24, 2010).
107 Jones, supra note 105, at 642.

at 643.
109 See Chemerinsky, supra note 1; see also Amber Phillips, Criminalcharges were just filed in Flint.
But suing over the water crisis remains very difficult., THE WASH. PosT (Apr. 20, 2016) https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/26/why-it-will-be-very-difficult-for-flint-residents-to-suethe-state-of-michigan-for-money/?utm-term=.61 I cba76a743.
108 Id.

110 Cicero, supra note 76, at 1.
M1Concerned Pastors, supra note 71, at 597.
112 Phillips, supra note 109.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Lead Poisoning in Children:A Proposed Legislative Solution to Municipal
Liability for Furnishing Lead-Contaminated Water, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 399, 410 (1992).
116 Id. at 411.
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condition." 1 7 Therefore, the threshold after which municipal governments may
be held liable seems to provide recourse for government-caused local water
contamination.
However, based on the severity and breadth of the water contamination in
Flint, plaintiffs are also pursuing action against the state, which has the potential
to provide more substantial relief.' 8 The plaintiffs' theory is that "the state denied citizens their basic constitutional rights by piping them water poisoned by
lead for 18 months." 19
V.

Proposal

The United Nations needs to create real remedial mechanisms and delineate
specifically how it will be responsible under humanitarian law. The shortcomings in recourse available to individuals under the influence of United Nations
missions is twofold. First, it undermines the very goals of human rights and
equality upon which the United Nations was founded. Second, it delegitimizes
the United Nations as a benevolent force in the world.
The similarities between the populations of Flint, Michigan and Haiti are striking, especially concerning their standing within their respective regions. They are
both economically feeble. They are surrounded by regions, cities or countries that
hold far more economic and political clout. Their populations are comprised of a
majority that is non-white. Both seem restrained to the nadir of their socioeconomic and political existence. Legal recourse for both of these imperiled populations is challenging to attain, at best.
However, a significant distinction between the cases of water contamination in
Haiti and Flint is the public perception and public relations campaign with regard
to each crisis. Although neither case has adequately remedied the problem in
those respective regions, the situation in Flint appears to have garnered a more
fervent public response.
In comparison to Flint, the public relations campaign with regard to the cholera crisis in Haiti represents uncharted territory as there is no precedent for the
establishment of "international victim relief funds." Such efforts have taken hold
in the United States in past decades in certain circumstances. For example, compensation plans were organized for the families of those injured or killed during
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 as well as for victims and their families who had been affected by the explosion of the oil rig Deepwater Horizon in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010.
Despite the differences in public perception between the water crises of Haiti
and Flint, there is a shocking causal connection between the actions of American
government and the United Nations and subsequent severe health problems and
deaths of innocent citizens. The totality of the damage is not yet quantifiable. Yet
the nature of the discourse that has followed appears to revolve not around the
117
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merits of the victims' claims. Rather, it revolves around the legal framework now
serving hurdle to achieving hope, equality and justice. In these tragic circumstances, it is the simple, ethical response - as Wayne State law professor Noah
Hall posits - that seems to have gotten lost in the debate:
"The state is better off accepting responsibility and moving the focus to how
are we going to fix this, compensate the victims and prevent future damage from
happening. The worst strategy is for the state to fight - the state shouldn't be
spending its resources fighting residents who are seeking compensation for the
harm they suffered. It should facilitate them getting compensation."
In the United States, it seems contradictory that an arm of government in a
democracy - empowered by the people of that democracy - would be able to do
harm without consequence. It is especially incomprehensible that a lack of accountability exists in a litigious society, where private citizens must answer for
actions far less damaging than those of public officials in Flint. It is confusing
that there can be such a dearth of culpability in a nation that prides itself in many
regards as promoting a meritocracy.
VI.

Conclusion

Two-thousand five hundred and fifteen days after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti
that precipitated support from the United Nations and led to peacekeepers devastating Haiti with cholera, the United Nations apologized. 1 2 0 United Nations Sec12 1
retary-General Ban Ki-moon apologized in three different languages.
However, the United Nations carefully sculpted its apology so as not to assume
any legal responsibility. 1 2 2 During those twenty-five hundred days, the death toll
has risen to an estimated ten thousand (10,000) people.1 23 The response to the
outbreak is long underway, but it is merely an effort to restore Haiti and its
people to their status before the United Nations intervention. The United Nations
claims it is close to having the amount necessary to fund repairs to Haiti's water
and sanitation system and to being able to provide cholera treatment for Haitians.
However, as of December 1, 2016, the United Nations had raised only five hundred thousand ($500,000) - or 0.25% - of its pledge to provide Haitians with
"material compensation." 1 2 4 In August 2017, a New York federal judge dismissed the only remaining class action lawsuit regarding water contamination in
25
Haiti against the United Nations.1
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The devastation that the United Nations unleashed in Haiti cannot be excused
as a coincidental effect of humanitarian aid. To allow such an excuse is to annihilate any semblance of a legal duty that the United Nations holds. Compared to
the plight of those affected by water contamination in Flint, the effects in Haiti
have been more immediate in terms of the score of deaths of people in Haiti.
While residents in Flint are at risk for brain damage and other health problems,
thousands of Haitians are already dead. However, both scenarios will likely have
longstanding, deleterious impact on local populations. Despite major humanitarian efforts to support Haiti, and a nearly-hundred million dollar settlement for
the residents of Flint, the full depth of devastation in both cases has yet to be
realized. An equitable or just outcome appears unattainable within the current
legal framework. Both crises should cause moral outrage and warrant much more
than government resistance and meaningless apologies aimed at reviving a deteriorating public image.
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